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Abstract
By an unfounded chain for a function f : X → X we mean a sequence (xn)n∈! of elements
of X s.t. fxn+1 = xn for every n. Unfounded chains can be regarded as a generalization of 7xed
points, but on the other hand are linked with concepts concerning non-well-founded situations, as
ungrounded sentences and the hypergame. In this paper, among other things, we prove a lemma
in general topology, we exhibit an extensional recursive function from the set of sentences of PA
into itself without an unfounded chain, and we prove that every term in a Magari algebra (or di-
agonalizable algebra) has an unfounded chain. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
MSC: primary 03F45; secondary 06E25; 03B25; 03D45
Keywords: Non-well-founded relations; Diagonalizable algebras; Fixed points
0. The problem
Let f be a function from a non-empty set X into itself. For every element x0 of X
we can inductively de7ne the sequence x0, fx0; f2x0; : : : : If suitable conditions about
the set X and the function f are satis7ed, a 7xed-point theorem can be proved: in this
case, there is an element a∈X s.t. fa= a.
We will consider a slightly di@erent pattern:
Denition 1. We say that a sequence (xn)n∈! of elements of X is an unfounded chain
(or an in&nite descending chain) for the function f if fxn+1 = xn for every n.
(As usual, ! stands for the set of natural numbers; in the sequel we will often omit
“n∈!” and write brieCy (xn).)
Of course, not all functions have an unfounded chain (think of the successor function
in the set !). On the other hand, if f has a 7xed point a, it has also the constant
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unfounded chain (a)n∈!. More generally, if f has a periodic point (or a 7nite cycle,
i.e. if there are x0; x1; : : : ; xn, s.t. fx0 = x1; : : : ; fxn = x0), then f has an unfounded chain.
This paper is concerned with the following problem:
&nd conditions on the set X and the function f that guarantee the existence of an
unfounded chain.
In particular, we will try to 7nd solutions to our problem considering known 7xed
point theorems and weakening the hypotheses there.
As stated, the problem is very general. In fact, our main interest is in functions from
the set  of sentences of PA into itself. However, at the beginning of the paper we
will examine more general situations, to 7nd tools and lemmas which will be useful
later.
In Section 1 connections between the problem and known paradoxes are discussed.
In Section 2, after some remarks, a result in general topology is proved (Theorems 2
and 3). From Section 3 on, we are concerned with logic. In Section 4 we exhibit an
extensional recursive function from  into itself that admits no unfounded chain. In
Section 5 we prove a theorem regarding terms in Magari algebras (or diagonalizable
algebras), while Section 6 describes a typical example in the same context. Other
remarks and results are discussed in Section 7.
Throughout the paper, a number of open problems are posed.
1. Self-reference vs. ungroundedness
In most classical logic paradoxes, the argument rests on self-reference and nega-
tion; in particular, self-reference is usually regarded as the element responsible for
paradoxes. On the other hand, paradoxical arguments can be partially translated into
formal contexts, so that they lead to important results. In this framework, self-reference
is deeply connected with 7xed point theorems: think of the Diagonalization Lemma in
Peano arithmetic, which allows self-referential constructions and, as a consequence,
yields classical incompleteness results.
But there are also paradoxes where the crucial role is played by unfounded relations
instead of self-reference. In fact, to avoid all paradoxical sentences, Kripke (see [8])
introduced the concept of an ungrounded sentence, i.e. a sentence such that the pro-
cess of determining its truth value by examining the sentences it refers to, does not
terminate, either because one 7nds again an already considered sentence (7nite cycle
or, in particular, self-reference), or because there is an in7nite regression. Of course,
we cannot de7ne a rank, or a level for an ungrounded sentence.
Let us brieCy review three paradoxes based on an unfounded relation (see [1, 3] for
further discussion).
(i) There are denumerable many people a0; a1; a2; : : :, and each one says the same
sentence, “at least one of the people after me [i.e. whose index is greater than mine]
is lying”. It is not possible to assign consistent truthvalues T , F to the statements,
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because every T must be followed by at least one F , whilst every F must be followed
only by T ’s.
In contrast to the liar’s paradox, there is no self-reference, not even an indirect one:
if ai speaks about aj’s sentence, then aj does not speak about ai’s sentence. A paradox
also arises if all of the statements are “Only &nitely many of the people coming after
me are telling the truth”; note that in this version negation does not appear (neither
does implication).
(ii) (See [18].) A game G between two players A and B is said to be grounded
if every game of G terminates after 7nitely many moves (even if there is no 7xed
bound on the lengths of games). De7ne the hypergame as follows: player A chooses
a grounded game G, then player B makes the 7rst move in G and the game continues
according to the rules of G.
Since G is grounded, also this game has an end; thus, hypergame is grounded. As
a consequence, in a game of hypergame, player A can choose the hypergame itself as
a grounded game, giving B the right to choose. But, if B in turn chooses hypergame,
and so on, we get an in7nite game in which both players move according to the rules
of a grounded game.
(iii) (See [15]; this paradox dates back to 1953, while the two previous ones were
introduced only few years ago.) In naive set-theory, a set A is said to be grounded if
every ∈-descending chain starting from A
: : : ∈ x3 ∈ x2 ∈ x1 ∈ A
is 7nite. Let B be the set of all grounded sets. Now, B itself is grounded because
if A belongs to B then A is grounded, and as a consequence there is no in7nite ∈-
descending chain starting from B. Therefore, B∈B and we can write : : : ∈B∈B∈B.
Summing up: we proved that B is grounded and, from this very fact, we deduced that
B is not grounded.
In [3] it is stressed that, as the diagonal method arises from self-referential paradoxes,
also ungrounded arguments can be translated into a proof schema. For instance, to built
a non-recursively enumerable set, de7ne a relation E on ! as follows: xEy i@ x∈Wy,
and call an element x grounded if every chain of the kind : : : x3Ex2Ex1Ex is 7nite. Then
the set F = {x=x is grounded} is not recursively enumerable. Suppose, on the contrary,
that F =Wz for some z: then also z is grounded (since xEz implies that x is grounded);
it follows z ∈Wz, i.e. zEz, and z is ungrounded (: : : EzEzEz). In fact, it is not too hard
to prove that F is 11-complete.
In a similar way we can prove, for instance, two classical Cantor theorems: a function
from a set X to its power set P(X ) cannot be surjective, and the set of real numbers
is not denumerable (see [3]).
This paper 7ts into the general program of investigating formal situations in which
ungrounded constructions are allowed. In other words, our aim is to 7nd where and how
ungrounded sentences can be safely used, keeping in mind that ungrounded sentences
occur meaningfully in many informal contexts, from linguistics to computer science,
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from game theory to probability (see for instance [11, 7]). Moreover, there could be
connections with other logical subjects, such as the Anti-Foundation Axiom in set
theory and non-well-founded sets (see for instance [1]).
2. First results – a theorem in general topology
The following two propositions give a positive answer to the problem stated at the
beginning in two trivial cases.
Proposition. If X is a &nite set; then any function f :X →X has an unfounded chain
(in fact; f must admit a &nite cycle).
Corollary 1. Let A be a locally &nite algebra (in the sense that every subalgebra
generated by a &nite set is &nite – e.g.; a Boolean algebra). Then any polynomial
f :A→A has an unfounded chain.
Proof. It is enough to note that, for every x; f maps the 7nite subalgebra generated
by x and by the parameters that occur in f, into itself.
Proposition. If f :X →X is a surjective function; then f has an unfounded chain.
Remark. In the proof of the previous proposition (start from any element x0, choose
an x1 s.t. fx1 = x0, and so on), we apply a weak form of the axiom of choice, namely
the axiom of dependent choices. In the sequel we will often use the axiom of choice
in proofs, without indicating it explicitly.
Corollary 2. A function f :X →X has an unfounded chain i< there exists a non-
empty subset A of X s.t. A=f(A).
Proof. Given an unfounded chain (an); de7ne A to be the set {an=n∈!} ∪ {fna0=n∈
!}. The other direction is proved as in the previous proposition.
We can reformulate somewhat the condition expressed in Corollary 2; for instance:
A⊆f(A); or A⊆fn(A) for some positive integer n; or for every x∈A there is an n
s.t. x∈fn(A).
A simple necessary condition is the following:
(∗) If f has an unfounded chain, then ⋂n∈! Imfn = ∅
(where Imfn denotes the range of the function fn).
However, the converse of (∗) does not hold: using the language of relations, an
element can be founded, without being of 7nite height (we are thinking of the relation
R de7ned as follows: xR y i@ fx=y).
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To get a necessary and suOcient condition, ordinal numbers can be considered. For
every f :X →X , de7ne by induction:
Imf0 = X ; Imf+1 = f(Imf); Imf =
⋂
¡
Imf (if  is limit):
Theorem 1. A function f has an unfounded chain i< all Imf are non-empty.
Proof. The statement is a consequence of Corollary 2. If a subset A of X is s.t.
A=f(A), then A⊆ Imf for every ordinal . Conversely, if all Imf are non-empty,
since ¡ implies Imf⊇ Imf , there is an  s.t. Imf = Imf+1 =f(Imf).
Remark. In the statement of Theorem 1, we can obviously restrict ourselves to all
ordinal numbers whose cardinality is less than or equal to Card X . Similar constructions
are familiar in other contexts: in particular, we are referring to the Cantor Bendixson
index for topological spaces.
In general topology many 7xed-point theorems are known. Obviously, not any com-
pact subset of Rn enjoys the 7xed point property: it is enough to consider a disconnected
set, or a rotation in a circle S1.
Theorem 2. Let X be a compact Hausdor< space and let f :X →X be a continuous
function; then f has an unfounded chain. 1
Proof. Using notation as in Theorem 1, we claim that, for every ordinal , the set
Imf is a non-empty closed subset of X . We proceed by induction. The case =0 is
trivial. If Imf is closed, it is also compact and, therefore, Imf+1 =f(Imf) is in
turn compact; since X is Hausdor@, Imf+1 is closed and, obviously, non-empty if so
is Imf. If  is a limit ordinal, Imf is closed, as it is the intersection of closed sets,
and is non-empty, since X is compact.
In fact, since X is compact, it would be enough to consider Imf with 6!, in
the sense that Imf! =f(Imf!); see the proof of Theorem 9.
We get a similar result slightly modifying the hypotheses.
Theorem 3. Let X be a sequentially compact Hausdor< space and let f :X →X be
a continuous function; then f has an unfounded chain.
1 A problem published in the American Mathematical Monthly (October 1995 - n. 10476) asked to prove
that if X is a countable compact Hausdor< space, then every continuous map f :X →X has a periodic
point. This can be proved de7ning a binary relation R on X as follows: xR y i@ y is an accumulation
point of the set {fnx=n∈!}. By Baire’s theorem, R is a strict partial ordering; by Zorn’s Lemma, there is
a maximal point with respect to R. Lastly, notice that a point x is maximal i@ the set {fnx=n∈!} is 7nite
i@ this set contains a periodic point.
This result is obviously related to the statement of Theorem 2; however, it does not seem to have signi7cant
applications in logic, because of the hypothesis that X is countable. In a sense, in this as in other contexts,
considering unfounded chains seems to allow simpler statements and more natural hypotheses.
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Proof. For any x in X , consider the sequence (fnx). Let (fnix) be a convergent
subsequence of it, and let x0 be its limit. Now, consider the sequence (fni−1x) (drop-
ping the 7rst element if it makes no sense): also this has a convergent subsequence
(fmi−1x). If x1 is its limit, by the continuity of f and the uniqueness of the limit, we
have fx1 =f(limfmi−1x)= limfmix= x0. Iterating the same procedure, we get the
required sequence.
Example 1. It is readily seen that both hypotheses in Theorems 2 and 3 are needed;
for instance, consider the successor function in the set ! with the co7nite topology,
which is a compact, sequentially compact non-Hausdor@ space.
The next theorem gives a combinatorial characterization.
Theorem 4. A function f from a non-empty set X into itself has an unfounded chain
i< there are two functions g; h :X →X s.t. fgh= g.
Proof. (⇐) Let x ∈ X . Then gx= f ghx=ffghhx= · · ·. De7ning an to be ghnx, we
have: fan+1 = fgh
n+1x= ghnx= an.
(⇒) Let (an) be a sequence s.t. fan+1 = an. Take as g any “projection” from X to
the set {an=n∈!}, i.e. a function s.t. gan = an. De7ne h as follows: if gx= an, then
hx= an+1. If gx= an, we have fghx= fgan+1 = fan+1 = an = gx.
Note two particular cases. If g is a constant function, then from fgh= g it follows
fg= g: therefore f admits a 7xed point. If, on the other hand, g is the identity function,
then from fgh= g it follows that fh is the identity function: therefore f is surjective.
Let us close this section by mentioning a question which will not be further discussed
in this paper: when can we &nd an unfounded chain (an) s.t. an = am for n =m?
It is not hard to prove that this is the case, for instance, of the relation E de7ned in
! as follows: xEy if x ∈ Wy. To 7nd suOcient conditions, the concept of a complete
relation (in a denumerable set) can be applied (see [4, 3, 6]).
3. Functions in the set of sentences
We will refer to Peano arithmetic PA, even if what follows applies to other theories
as well. Sentences will be identi7ed with their GRodel numbers; for every sentence p; Sp
stands for the numeral of (the GRodel number of) p.
Let us recall a classical 7xed-point theorem in logic, from which one can deduce
the two GRodel Theorems, Tarski Theorem, LRob Theorem, as well as the fact that the
set of theorems of PA is e@ectively inseparable from the set of negations of theorems.
Diagonalization Lemma (DL). For every formula H (v) of PA, where v is free; there
is a sentence p s.t. p is provably equivalent to H ( Sp).
De7ne the relation ∼PA as follows: x∼PA y if x and y are sentences which are
provably equivalent in PA. If sentences are considered up to the relation ∼PA, DL is a
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7xed-point theorem: called  the set of sentences of PA; every recursive function from
the set  into itself, which is induced by a formula H (v); has a 7xed-point. However,
it is trivial that not every recursive function from  into itself has a 7xed-point (up to
∼PA): it is enough to consider the function induced by the connective ¬. On the other
hand, this function has obvious cycles of length 2.
A natural conjecture is the following: every recursive function f from the set  into
itself has an unfounded chain (pn) up to ∼PA (in the sense that fpn+1 is provably
equivalent to pn). But, without further hypotheses, this conjecture is false. Indeed, let
(qn) be an e@ective sequence of sentences s.t. qn =∈n for every n. Let f be the function
which maps a sentence p in qn if the normal prenex form of p is a n-formula (but
not a n−1-formula). 2 Obviously, f cannot have an unfounded chain.
In the next section, after setting DL in a general context, we will construct a more
interesting counterexample.
Now, let us restrict ourselves to the recursive functions from  into itself, that can
be expressed as Boolean combinations of:
the identity function,
functions induced by some formula H (v) with the variable v free.
Open problem. Every such function has an unfounded chain.
By Corollary 1, f has a 7nite cycle if all formulas that occur in the construction of
f are “constant” (H (v) is “constant” if H ( Sp) ∼PA H ( Sq) for every p and q). The next
theorem gives a positive answer in other cases.
Theorem 5. Let H (v) be a formula. Then each of the following functions has an
unfounded chain:
(i) fp=p∧H ( Sp) and fp=p∨H ( Sp);
(ii) fp=p↔H ( Sp);
(iii) fp=¬p∧H ( Sp) and fp=¬p∨H ( Sp).
Proof. (i) These functions have the same 7xed-point as H (v).
(ii) The statement follows from the fact that f is surjective (up to ∼PA): indeed,
given a sentence a, apply DL to the formula a ↔ H (v) to get a q s.t. q ∼PA a ↔ H ( Sq);
it is obvious that a ∼PA q ↔ H ( Sq).
(iii) Let us prove that the 7rst function has a cycle of length 2; a similar argu-
ment applies to the second function. Apply DL to the formula ¬H (v)∧H (H (v)) to
get a sentence q s.t. q∼PA ¬H ( Sq)∧H (H ( Sq)). Then fq=¬q∧H ( Sq)∼PA H ( Sq), since
q→¬H ( Sq) is a theorem. On the other hand, f mapsH ( Sq) in ¬H ( Sq)∧H (H ( Sq)) ∼PA q.
2 Throughout the paper, n denotes the set of sentences which are provably equivalent to a formula with
a n pre7x. However here, to obtain a recursive function, we just count the number of quanti7ers in the
normal prenex form of p.
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Remark. In the case (ii) of the previous theorem, we get a sequence (an) of sentences,
where each an “says” that an+1 is provably equivalent to H (an+1). For suitable formulas
H (v), these sentences can be regarded as ungrounded.
We will see in Section 5, in a more abstract context, that every function built
starting from the identity function, Boolean operations, and the function induced by
the provability predicate Theor(v), has an unfounded chain.
4. A counterexample
To 7nd a general framework for 7xed-point theorems, Ershov suggested the concept
of a precomplete equivalence relation. Let us brieCy review some concepts and results.
In the following, we will consider only recursively enumerable (or positive) equivalence
relations on the set !.
Denition 2 (see for instance Bernardi and Sorbi [4], Lachlan [9] or Shavrukov [14]).
An equivalence relation R (di@erent from the trivial relation !×!) is said to be pre-
complete if for every partial recursive function  there is a total recursive function g
s.t., if  converges on x, then  xR gx.
Ershov xed-point theorem. Assume that R is a precomplete equivalence relation.
For every total recursive function f there is a &xed-point; that is; a number n s.t.
fnR n.
Proposition (Visser [17]). Consider n sentences (more precisely; consider a GDodel
numbering just for n sentences); and de&ne x ∼n y i< x and y are provably equivalent
n sentences. The relation ∼n is precomplete.
Note that the Diagonalization Lemma can be immediately deduced from the quoted
results. For, let H (v) be a formula and assume that its pre7x is n. If we map every
n sentence p in H ( Sp), we have a recursive function from n into n. By the Ershov
7xed-point theorem, there is a sentence p0 s.t. H (p0) ∼n p0, that is, H (p0) and p0
are provably equivalent. On the other hand, ∼PA is not precomplete, because, as we
have already noted, there are recursive functions without 7xed-points.
ADN Theorem (Visser [17]). Let R be a precomplete equivalence relation; and let
) and  be two partial recursive functions; assume that ) is a diagonal function for
R; in the sense that; if )x↓; then )x R x. Then there is a total recursive function g
s.t.; if  x↓; then  xR gx; while; if  x↑; then gx =∈domain). Moreover; an index of
g can be found in a uniform way starting from indices of );  ;R.
Coming back to the problem discussed in Section 3, a reasonable hypothesis is
expressed by the following.
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Denition 3. We say that a function f :→ is extensional if p ∼PA q implies
f∼PA fq, for every p and q.
However, we are in a position to built a recursive extensional function h; which
admits no unfounded chain up to ∼PA. The symbol [p] denotes the set of (GRodel
numbers of) sentences which are provably equivalent to p.
Theorem 6. There exists a total recursive function h; which is extensional and
increasing; in the sense that; if h([p])⊆ [q]; then the minimum of [p] is less than
the minimum of [q]. Moreover; h is an injective function; up to the relation ∼PA.
Proof. De7ne h by induction. Let h0 be ¬0.
Assuming that h0; : : : ; hm have already been de7ned, let n be the least number s.t.
the sentences 0; : : : ; m; m + 1; h0; : : : ; hm and their negations belong to n; 3 consider
the precomplete relation ∼n. De7ne two partial recursive functions ) and  as follows:
)x=¬x for x ∈ [0]∪ · · · ∪ [m + 1]∪ [h0]∪ · · · ∪ [hm] and divergent otherwise (of
course, ) is a diagonal function);
 x= hi, if x ∼n i for some i¡m+ 1, and divergent otherwise.
Apply the ADN Theorem to get a total recursive function g s.t. gx ∼n  x for all
x s.t.  x↓, and gx =∈ domain) for all x s.t.  x↑. De7ne h(m+ 1)= g(m+ 1) (strictly
speaking, g(m + 1) is the GRodel number of a n sentence when a GRodel numbering
just for n sentences is considered, while h(m+ 1) is the GRodel number of the same
sentence when a GRodel numbering for all sentences is considered).
Now, if m+1 ∼PA i for some i¡m+1, then h(m+1)= g(m+1) ∼n  (m+1)= hi
and therefore h(m + 1) ∼PA hi (i.e. h is extensional). On the other hand, if m + 1 is
not provably equivalent to any i¡m+ 1, then m+ 1 =∈ domain  and therefore h(m+
1)= g(m+ 1) =∈ domain): thus h(m+ 1) =∈ [hi] (i.e. h is injective), and h(m+ 1) =∈ [j]
for all j6m+ 1 (i.e. h is increasing).
Notice that in any inductive step a particular precomplete equivalence relation is
considered (in other words, n depends on m). The resulting function h is recursive
because the ADN Theorem holds in a uniform way.
Corollary 3. There exists a total recursive extensional function h from the set  of
sentences of PA into itself; which has no unfounded chain (in particular; h has neither
&xed points; nor &nite cycles).
Proof. Obvious.
Open problem. Let f be a recursive function s.t. f(1)⊆n for some n. Then f
has an unfounded chain.
3 See footnote 2.
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One could add stronger hypotheses about f; as for instance: (1) f is extensional, or
(2) fr(1)⊆n for all r. Note that Boolean combinations considered in the previous
section satisfy the second hypothesis.
5. A theorem in Magari algebras
Let us recall that a Magari algebra (or a diagonalizable algebra – brieCy an MA) is
a Boolean algebra 〈B; 0; 1; ∨ ;∧;¬〉 endowed with a unary operator , s.t. the following
identities hold: 1= 1; (x∧y)= x∧ y, (x∨¬ x)= x.
The main example of an MA is the Lindenbaum algebra of PA: is de7ned as
[p] = [Theor( Sp)], where Theor(v) is the standard provability predicate. MA’s, as
well as the corresponding modal logic GL; provide a suitable algebraic framework to
study incompleteness phenomena – see for instance [5, 16], or [13] for more recent
results. In particular, the Diagonalization Lemma admits the following translation:
Fixed-point theorem (see Bernardi [2]; Sambin [12]). Let h be a polynomial in the
variable x s.t. x occurs only within the scope of a . Then in every MA there exists
an element a s.t. ha= a.
Several proofs of this theorem are known. Moreover, it has been generalized in
various respects; in 1993 Mardaev [10] dropped the hypothesis that the variable x
occurs only within the scope of a , and found 7xed points for polynomials in which
all occurrences of x are positive. However, it is obvious that there are terms 4 (e.g. ¬x)
with no 7xed point. In the next theorem, we intend to show that in MA’s unfounded
chains can be constructed, with respect to a larger and more natural class of functions.
Theorem 7. Let f be a term in one variable. Then in every MA there exists a sequence
(an) s.t. fan+1 = an for all n.
The proof will be divided into four lemmas.
First remarks and notation. Since only constants are involved, the statement holds
in every MA i@ it holds in the free MA F0 on the empty set. From a logical point of
view, the elements of F0 can be obtained starting from 1 (set of theorems) and 0 (set
of refutable sentences), and applying Boolean operations and the operator Con, where
Con[p], for every sentence p, is the consistency of the theory PA+p.
As is proved in [2], the Boolean structure of F0 is isomorphic with the algebra
of 7nite and co7nite subsets of !; so F0 can be regarded as a Boolean subalgebra
of P(!). Moreover, the operator can be extended to P(!) considering “¿” in !
4 Speaking of a term in an algebra 〈A;F〉, where F is a set of operations de7ned in the set A; we mean
a function from An into A built from the elements of F: Replacing the occurrences of some variables by
elements of A; we get a polynomial.
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as the accessibility relation in the usual modal meaning; in this way, F0 becomes a
Magari subalgebra of P(!), and the term f can be extended to P(!).
We identify P(!) with the Cantor set 2!, i.e. with a subset of the real line with
the usual topology; it is not diOcult to check that F0 consists of all sequences which
are de7nitely constant, or, in other words, of the extremes of all removed intervals.
If x ∈ 2!, the elements of the sequence x will be called digits of x (we consider the
digits 0 and 1, even if in the Cantor set the digits 0 and 2 are usually considered).
Note that, when x; y∈F0 are regarded as real numbers, ¬x is 1 − x, whereas x∧y
and x∨y are not the minimum and the maximum between x and y.
If x ∈ 2! and A⊆!, we write x|A to denote the restriction of x to A; in particular,
assuming as usual that n + 1= {0; : : : ; n}, the symbol x|n stands for the 7rst n digits
of x. Let Unx be the set {y∈ 2!=y|n = x|n}, i.e. the neighborhood of x determined by
the 7rst n digits of x; of course, every Unx is a clopen set.
Since f is a continuous function and the Cantor set 2! is compact, we can apply
Theorem 2 to 7nd an unfounded chain in 2!: the point is to show that an unfounded
chain exists in F0.
Example 2. There exists a continuous function k from 2! into itself, s.t. k(F0)⊆F0
and no unfounded chain exists in F0. Indeed, de7ne kx= 〈1〉 ∗ x if the 7rst digit of x
is 0 and kx= 〈0〉 ∗ x if the 7rst digit of x is 1 (where ∗ stands for concatenation).
Lemma 1. (i) Let f be a term. For every x ∈ 2! and every n; the &rst n digits of fx
depend only on the &rst n digits of x.
(ii) For every x there exists an n s.t.; in the set !−n; the value fx coincides either
with 0; or with 1; or with x; or with ¬x.
Proof. Trivial, by induction on the structure of f.
Lemma 2. As regards the four possibilities in Lemma 1(ii); the behaviour of fx can
depend on x; 5 but; if x∈ 2!−F0; it is the same for all points in some neighborhood
of x. More precisely;
(i) if x =∈F0 and fx∈F0; then there is an n s.t. fy= fx for all y in Unx (f is locally
constant);
(ii) if both x and fx belong to 2!−F0; then there is an n s.t. either for all y in Unx
we have fy|n = fx|n and fy|!−n =y|!−n; or for all y in Unx we have fy|n = fx|n
and fy|!−n =¬y|!−n; as a consequence, there is an n s.t. f(Unx )=Unfx and; from
a geometrical point of view; f is locally an isometry.
5 For example, let fx be the term [x∧ (x∨¬ 0)]∨ [¬ x∧ (x∨ 0∨¬ 20)] and think of its domain
as P(!) instead of 2!: if x is the set of even numbers, fx eventually coincides with x; if x is the set of
odd numbers, fx eventually coincides with ¬ x; if x is the set P of positive even numbers, fx eventually
coincides with 0; if x is the set !− P, fx eventually coincides with 1.
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Proof. Also this proof is by induction on the structure of f. It is obvious that the
term x and the constant term 0 satisfy the statement; and it is readily seen that, if two
terms g and h satisfy the statement, so do ¬ g and g∧ h. Then consider a term g of
the form h for some term h (note that, if this is the case, gx∈F0); there are two
possibilities: either hx=1, or hx =1. In the 7rst case, hx=1 and, by the inductive
hypothesis, h takes the value 1 in all the points of a neighborhood of x (note that the
equalities x=1 and x= x do not hold in any neighborhood of x=1; therefore the
statement does not hold if x∈F0). In the second case, called m the least number s.t.
the mth digit of hx is 0, by Lemma 1(i) the term h takes the same value (that is,
m+10) for all y∈Um+1x .
Now, keeping in mind the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, let A be the subset of 2!
de7ned as A=
⋂
f2! where the intersection is taken over the class of all ordinals ;
we know that f(A)=A and that A is (non-empty and) compact.
Lemma 3. If A∩F0 = ∅; then there is an unfounded chain (an) in F0.
Proof. Let a0 be an element of A∩F0. Since a0 ∈A; by Corollary 2 there is a chain
(an) in A s.t. fan+1 = an: it is enough to prove that also a1 belongs to F0 because
the same argument can be iterated. We claim that, since a1 ∈A and fa1 ∈F0, also
a1 must belong to F0. Assume a1 =∈F0. Since fa1 ∈F0 we can apply Lemma 2(i):
restrict all elements in the chain to the 7rst n digits, where n is as in Lemma 2(i)
for fa1. There must exist two numbers i; j (i¿j¿1) s.t. ai|n = aj|n; by Lemma 1(i)
we have fj−1ai|n =fj−1aj|n = a1|n: From fa1 = a0 ∈F0, by Lemma 2(i), it follows
f(fj−1ai)= ai−j ∈F0; we conclude that a1 =fi−j−1ai−j ∈F0.
The proof of Theorem 7 is concluded by
Lemma 4. A∩F0 = ∅:
Proof. We proceed by absurd; more precisely the schema of the proof is the conse-
quentia mirabilis: assuming A∩F0 = ∅, we prove A∩F0 = ∅.
For every x in A; 7nd a neighborhood satisfying the conditions of Lemma 2(ii): we
have a covering of A; which, since A is compact, admits a 7nite subcovering (Ux)x∈K ,
K being a 7nite subset of A: We can also assume that all Ux are associated with the
same value of n (in geometrical words, all Ux have the same length), so that we can





Unfx must be equal to U
n
y for some y∈K (indeed, fx belongs to A and therefore to some





Unx : it follows that
⋃
Unx =A (a priori, we only knew that
⋃
Unx ⊇A).
But every Unx contains elements of F0, which, therefore, belong to A.
Open problem. The statement of Theorem 7 holds also in the case f is a poly-
nomial in one variable. (Note that Lemmas 1(ii) and 2 do not hold for polyno-
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mials in the MA P(!):) Moreover, if f(x; y1; : : : ; yk) is a polynomial in k + 1
variables, then there is a sequence (an) of polynomials in the variables y1; : : : ; yk
s.t. f(an+1(y1; : : : ; yk); y1; : : : ; yk)= an(y1; : : : ; yk):
6. An example
In this section we will discuss an example of a typical unfounded chain generated
by a term. For the sake of brevity, we will omit the proofs of some statements.
Let gx be the term x↔¬ x, that is, gx=¬ x↔ x, or also gx=¬ (x↔ x).
In every MA:
(i) gx admits no 7xed point: from a= a↔¬ a it follows a=0;
(ii) gx=y i@ g(¬y)=¬ x, and therefore (¬ g)2 is the identity function;
(iii) from the previous point it follows that g is a bijection;
(iv) for every term h in which x occurs only within the scope of a , there is
one and only one element a s.t. ha= ga: indeed, hx= x↔¬ x is equivalent
to x= hx↔¬ x; and the latter equation admits just one solution because any
term in which x occurs only within the scope of a has exactly one 7xed
point.
In F0 the term g does not admit 7nite cycles, but yields a unique chain (of order
type Z):
· · · → ¬ 0 → 1 → 0 → 0 → 20∧¬ 0 → 20 → · · · :
In fact, g enjoys a nice combinatorial property. Let x∈F0⊆ 2! and assume 7rst that
the digits of x are de7nitely equal to 0; read the sequence x from right to left as a natu-
ral number in binary notation (for instance, 20∧¬ 0 is the sequence (0; 1; 0; 0; 0; : : :),
that represents the number 2). One can prove that, under this coding, gn= n+1. Simi-
larly, if the digits of x are de7nitely equal to 1, to compute gx it is enough to “add 1”
to the sequence x, again starting with the 7rst digit at the left and taking into account
the fact that in each place 1+1 gives 10, the 1 of which must then be carried over to
the sum at the next place on the right. In particular, the Boolean element 1 is identi7ed
with the sequence with all digits equal to 1: adding 1, we get the sequence with all
digits equal to 0, i.e. g1=0.
It is nearly trivial that, in F0, the term gn yields n chains of type Z .
In some in7nite MA’s the term gx admits 7nite cycles: for instance, it is known that
in the MA of PA there is an element p s.t. p= ¬p (think of a Rosser sentence).
In this case, one can prove that g2p=p, i.e. there is a cycle of length 2.
From a logical point of view, identifying sentences with their equivalence classes,
gx is a true sentence i@ so is x, with the only exception of g1=0; so, the theory
PA+ g−1x is sound i@ so is the theory PA+ x, unless x is a contradiction. Moreover,
g−1x is not a theorem of the theory PA + x (if this theory is consistent), and is a
refutable sentence of the same theory i@ x→ x is a theorem of PA.
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7. A conjecture in recursion theory and a more general problem
Open problem. Let f be a total recursive function s.t.; if 7x is a characteristic
function; so is 7fx. Then f has an unfounded chain in the set of indices of
characteristic functions; in the sense that there is a sequence (xn) of numbers s.t.;
for every n; xn and fxn+1 are indices of the same characteristic function.
This statement is connected to the recursion theorem: the latter refers to 7xed points
for r.e. sets, while the former to unfounded chains in the case of decidable sets. Hy-
potheses about f could be weakened, considering a partial recursive function which
converges on indices of characteristic functions, or strengthened, considering only ex-
tensional functions (i.e. functions s.t. if x and y are indices for the same characteristic
function, also fx and fy are indices for the same characteristic function).
In fact, it is not completely trivial to construct an example of an extensional function
without 7nite cycles. To this end, represent a subset of ! as a sequence in {0; 1}, and
write it from right to left (for instance, the singleton of 2 becomes the sequence
“: : : 00100”, with just one digit equal to 1). Let f be the function that maps a subset
D of ! in the set D + 1, where the sum has to be carried out in binary notation (for
instance, : : : 10101 + 1= : : : 10110; in particular, we assume : : : 111 + 1= : : : 000): f
has no 7nite cycles, but has unfounded chains.
If f can be extended to the set P(!)∼= 2!, the situation looks like that discussed
in Section 5: since f is a continuous function and the Cantor set 2! is compact, we
can apply Theorem 2 to 7nd an unfounded chain in 2!: the point is to show that an
unfounded chain exists in the set of indices of decidable sets.
The problem introduced at the beginning of this paper can be generalized to a
sequence of functions, according to the following.
Denition 4. Let (fn) be a sequence of functions from a set X into itself. We say
that a sequence (xn) of elements of X is an unfounded chain for (fn) if fnxn+1 = xn
for every n.
Many results proved in Section 2 can be generalized: even if the proofs sometimes
become slightly more technical, it does not make a great di@erence if we consider a
sequence of functions instead of a single function. Let us see some results in the new
context.
Theorem 8. If X is a &nite set; then any sequence of functions fn :X →X admits an
unfounded chain.
Proof. De7ne a tree T in the following way: the set of nodes is the set X ×!∪{},
where  =∈X ×!, while the edges of T join every node of the kind (x; n + 1) with
(fx; n), and (x; 0) with  ( being the top of T ). Now, the tree T is in7nite and each
node has 7nitely many neighbors: so, by KRonig’s in7nity Lemma, T has an in7nite
branch, which corresponds to an unfounded chain.
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Proposition. If (fn) is a sequence of surjective functions; then (fn) admits an un-
founded chain.
Theorem 9 (see Theorem 2). Let X be a compact Hausdor< space and let fn :X→X
be a sequence of continuous functions; then (fn) has an unfounded chain.
Proof. Consider the sets X; f0X; f0f1X; f0f1f2X; : : : ; and let A0 be their intersection.
Similarly, starting from the sets X; fiX; fifi+1X; : : : ; call Ai their intersection. As in the
proof of Theorem 2, all these sets are closed and non-empty; notice that induction over
ordinal numbers is unnecessary. We claim that the equalities f0A1 =A0; f1A2 =A1; : : :
hold, from which the statement follows. The inclusion f0A1⊆A0 is obvious; on the
other hand, if a0 ∈A0, then, for each n, a0 ∈f0f1 : : : fnX ; hence, there is a yn ∈
f1 : : : fnX s.t. f0yn = a0. Call a1 an accumulation point of the sequence (yn); keeping
in mind that A1 is closed and f0 is continuous, we conclude that a1 ∈A1 and f0a1 = a0.
Therefore, A0⊆f0A1. In the same way, the other equalities are proved.
Theorem 10 (see Theorem 3). Let X be a sequentially compact Hausdor< space and
let fn :X →X be a sequence of continuous functions; then (fn) has an unfounded
chain.
Proof. For any x in X , consider the sequence f0x; f0f1x; f0f1f2x; : : : : Let (yn) be a
convergent subsequence of it, and let x0 be its limit. Now, “drop the f0” at the begin-
ning of all yn: also this sequence has a convergent subsequence (zn). If x1 is its limit, by
the continuity of f0 and the uniqueness of limit, we have f0x1 =f0(lim zn)= limf0zn=
lim yn = x0: Iterating the same procedure (and removing the 7rst element whenever it
makes no sense), we get the required sequence.
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